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Abstract 
The effects of decentralization on public sector outputs is much debated but little agreed 
upon.  This paper compares the remarkable case of Bolivia with the more complex case 
of Colombia to explore decentralization’s effects on public education outcomes.  In 
Colombia, decentralization of education finance improved enrollment rates in public 
schools.  In Bolivia, decentralization made government more responsive by re-directing 
public investment to areas of greatest need.  In both countries, investment shifted from 
infrastructure to primary social services.  In both, it was the behavior of smaller, poorer, 
more rural municipalities that drove these changes.  A key innovation of this paper is a 
methodology for estimating the effects of decentralization in a data-poor environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past few decades decentralization has become one of the most debated 
policy issues throughout both developing and developed worlds.  It is seen as central to 
the development efforts of countries as far afield as Chile, China, Guatemala and Nepal.  
And in the multiple guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism it is also squarely in 
the foreground of policy discourse in the EU, UK and US.  But surprisingly, there is little 
agreement in the empirical literature on the effects of decentralization on a number of 
important policy goals.  Advocates (e.g. Olowu and Wunsch 1990, Putnam 1993, World 
Bank 1994, UNDP 1993) argue that decentralization can make government more 
responsive to the governed by “tailoring levels of consumption to the preferences of 
smaller, more homogeneous groups” (Wallis and Oates 1988, 5).  Critics (e.g. Crook and 
Sverrisson 1999, Prud’homme 1995, Samoff 1990, Smith 1985, Tanzi 1995) dispute this, 
arguing that local governments are too susceptible to elite capture, too lacking in 
technical, human and financial resources, and too corrupt to produce a heterogeneous 
range of public services that respond efficiently to local demand.  And their profligacy is 
likely to endanger macroeconomic stability.  But neither side is able to substantiate its 
arguments convincingly with empirical evidence. 
 Much of the debate has taken place in these pages, similarly without resolution.  
Of 24 articles on decentralization, local government and responsiveness published in 
World Development since 1997, 11 report broadly positive results, and 13 are negative.  
Fiszbein (1997), Shankar and Shah (2003), de Oliveira (2002) and Parry (1997) are 
amongst the most enthusiastic, finding that decentralization can spur capacity building in 
local government (Colombia), decrease levels of regional inequality through political 
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competition (a sample of 26 countries), boost the creation and administration of protected 
areas (Bahia, Brazil), and improve educational outcomes (Chile), respectively.  Rowland 
(2001) and Blair (2000) find that decentralization improved the quality of democratic 
governance achieved in both large cities and small towns.  And Petro (2001) finds that 
local government played a pivotal role in raising levels of social capital in Novgorod, 
Russia by establishing common social values and priorities for the community.  Other 
authors, such as Andersson (2004), Larson (2002), McCarthy (2004) and Nygren (2005), 
are more cautious, arguing broadly that decentralization is a complex, problematic 
phenomenon, but may ultimately have positive effects on local welfare. 
 Amongst skeptics, some of the most striking are Ellis, Kutengule and Nyasulu 
(2003), Ellis and Mdoe (2003) and Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003), who find that 
decentralization will likely depress growth and rural livelihoods by facilitating the 
creation of new business licenses and taxes that stifle private enterprise (Malawi), and 
propagate rent-seeking behavior down to the district and lower levels, so becoming “part 
of the problem of rural poverty, not part of the solution”1 (Tanzania and Uganda), 
respectively.  Similarly, Bahiigwa, Rigby and Woodhouse (2005) and Francis and James 
(2003) show that decentralization in Uganda has not led to independent, accountable 
local governments, but rather to their capture by local elites, and hence to the failure of 
decentralization as a tool for poverty reduction.  Porter (2002) agrees for Sub-Saharan 
Africa more generally.  Regarding the environment, Woodhouse (2003) predicts that 
decentralization will fail to improve access of the poor to natural resources, or reduce 
ecological damage.  Casson and Obidzinski (2002) go further, reporting that 
decentralization in Indonesia has spurred depredatory logging by creating bureaucratic 
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actors with a stake in its proliferation.  The cross-country evidence of Martinez-Vazquez 
and McNab (2003) is similarly unhopeful, showing that we don’t know empirically 
whether decentralization affects growth directly or indirectly, and have no clear 
theoretical grounds for predicting a relationship either way.  Worse, de Mello’s (2000) 
study of 30 countries predicts that failures of intergovernmental fiscal coordination will 
lead to chronic deficits and, eventually, macroeconomic instability.  The papers of Sundar 
(2001), Thun (2004) and Wiggins, Marfo and Anchirinah (2004) offer more cautious, 
nuanced arguments, that are on the whole skeptical about the possibility of beneficial 
change through decentralization. 
 The larger literature is similarly inconclusive.  Amongst studies of Latin America, 
Campbell (2001) highlights the extraordinary scope of authority and resources that have 
been decentralized throughout the region, and argues that this “quiet revolution” has 
generated a new model of governance based on innovative, capable leadership, high 
popular participation, and a new implicit contract governing local taxation.  But Montero 
and Samuels (2004) argue that the political motives of reformers often combine with ex-
post vertical imbalances to make decentralization bad in terms of elite capture, regional 
inequality and macroeconomic stability.  Rodríguez-Posé and Gill (2004) elaborate 
further on the tension between inequality and stability for the case of Brazil, while 
Eskeland and Filmer (2002) find econometric evidence that decentralization did lead to 
improvements in Argentine educational achievement scores. 
Amongst the broadest international surveys: Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis 
(1983) note that decentralization has seldom, if ever, lived up to expectations.  Most 
developing countries implementing decentralization experienced serious administrative 
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problems.  Although few comprehensive evaluations of the benefits and costs of 
decentralization efforts have been conducted, those that were attempted indicate limited 
success in some countries but not others.  A decade and a half later, surveys by Piriou-
Sall (1998), Manor (1999) and Smoke (2001) are slightly more positive, but with caveats 
about the strength of the evidence in decentralization’s favor.  Manor ends his study with 
the judgment that “while decentralization …is no panacea, it has many virtues and is 
worth pursuing”, after noting that the evidence, though extensive, is still incomplete.  
Smoke finds the evidence mixed and anecdotal, and asks whether there is empirical 
justification for pursuing decentralization at all.  More recently, in a review of 56 studies 
published since the late-1990s, Shah, Thompson and Zou (2004) find evidence that 
decentralization has in some cases improved, and in others worsened, service delivery, 
corruption, macroeconomic stability, and growth across a large range of countries.  The 
lack of progress is striking. 
This paper examines decentralization’s effects on educational outcomes in Bolivia 
and Colombia.  We first examine how decentralization changed investment flows across 
sectors, and across space, in both countries.  We then focus much more closely on 
education.  Our analysis is unusual in that it uses large-N, quantitative evidence to 
explore the link between decentralization and a specific policy outcome (in this case 
enrollment rates).  Most of the literature focusing on such links uses qualitative data (e.g. 
legal and regulatory information; see Parry 1997) or small-N empirics (e.g. case studies; 
see Manor 1999).  To our knowledge, this is the first study that links decentralization 
with school enrollments using nationwide data.  We provide evidence for such a link for 
Colombia, and get as close as the data allow for Bolivia. 
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Why focus on these two countries in particular?  There are four reasons: (i) in 
both cases, decentralization was advocated as a remedy for a state whose 
unresponsiveness to citizens’ needs fed serious internal tensions, including armed 
insurgency in Colombia; (ii) in both cases, decentralizing reforms were pursued in a 
vigorous and sustained manner; (iii) the broad geographic, institutional and historical 
similarities these countries share limit problems of data comparability and interpretation; 
and (iv) although their internal ructions have attracted much international attention 
recently, both are relatively underrepresented in the literature.  Bolivia is particularly 
deserving of study because reform there consisted of a large change in policy at a discrete 
point in time, thus rendering it a sort of natural experiment.  Colombia is more relevant 
for many middle-income countries because of its greater wealth, level of development, 
and relatively high state capacity.  And its more complex, multifaceted reform process is 
more typical of decentralizations around the world.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
comparative study of decentralization in Bolivia and Colombia. 
 Decentralization is henceforth defined as the devolution by central (i.e. national) 
government of specific functions, with all of the administrative, political and economic 
attributes that these entail, to democratic local (i.e. municipal) governments which are 
independent of the center within a legally delimited geographic and functional domain.  
We mostly ignore intermediate levels of government (departments) for two reasons: (i) 
Bolivia decentralized directly to municipalities, by-passing departments entirely at first, 
and only recently making prefects elected; Colombia did not, but focusing on 
municipalities facilitates the country comparison.  And (ii) the simplicity of the definition 
thus facilitated aids analytical clarity. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the Bolivian and 
Colombian decentralization programs, focusing on their legal and budgetary aspects.  
Section 3 examines decentralization’s effects on public investment flows in both 
countries.  Section 4 presents our quantitative methodology.  Section 5 examines whether 
decentralization made education investment more responsive to local needs in Bolivia, 
and whether it increased school enrollment in Colombia, with detailed econometric 
evidence.  And section 6 concludes. 
2. THE BOLIVIAN AND COLOMBIAN DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAMS 
(a) Popular participation in Bolivia 
 On the eve of revolution, Bolivia was a poor, semi-feudal country with extreme 
levels of inequality, presided over by a “typical racist state in which the non-Spanish 
speaking indigenous peasantry was controlled by a small, Spanish speaking white elite, 
[their power] based ultimately on violence more than consensus or any social pact” 
(Klein 1993, 237; our translation).  The nationalist revolution of 1952, which 
expropriated the “commanding heights” of the economy, land and mines, launched 
Bolivia on the road to one of the most centralized state structures in the region.  The 
government embarked upon a state-led modernization strategy in which public 
corporations and regional governments initiated a concerted drive to break down 
provincial fiefdoms, transform existing social relations, and create a modern, industrial, 
egalitarian society (Dunkerley 1984).  To this end the President directly appointed 
Prefects, who in turn designated entire regional governments and associated 
dependencies, forming a national chain of cascading authority emanating from the 
Palacio Quemado in La Paz.  
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 The intellectual trends of the 1950s-1970s – Dependency theory, Import 
Substitution Industrialization, and Developmentalism – contributed to the centralizing 
tendency, as did the military governments which overthrew elected administrations with 
increasing frequency from the 1960s on (Klein 1993).  With political power so little 
dispersed, there was little point in establishing the legal and political instruments of local 
governance.  As a result, beyond the nine regional capitals (including La Paz) and an 
additional 25-30 cities, local government existed in Bolivia at best in name, as an 
honorary and ceremonial institution devoid of administrative capability and starved for 
funds.  And in most of the country it did not exist at all. 
 Although the 1994 reform was sprung on an unsuspecting nation, the concept of 
decentralization was by no means new.  For more than 30 years a decentralization debate 
focused on Bolivia’s nine departments ebbed and flowed politically – at times taking on 
burning importance, other times all but forgotten.  The issue became caught up in the 
country’s centrifugal tensions, as regional elites in Santa Cruz and Tarija consciously 
manipulated the threat of secession to Brazil and Argentina respectively – with which 
each is economically more integrated than La Paz – to extract resources from the center.  
The Bolivian paradox of a highly centralized but weak state, and a socially diverse 
population with weak national identity, meant that such threats were taken seriously by 
the political class, which blocked all moves to devolve more power and authority to 
Bolivia’s regions. 
So what spurred the change of tack? and why then?  Two factors stand out.  The 
less important one arises from Bolivia’s failure to achieve sustained, healthy growth 
despite wrenching economic reform overseen by the IMF and World Bank.  Fifteen years 
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of near-zero per capita economic growth sapped the credibility of the state and fomented 
social unrest.  The new Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) administration 
of Pres. Sánchez de Lozada saw the structure of government itself as an impediment to 
growth.  Decentralization was an attempt to deepen structural reform in order to make the 
state more efficient and responsive to the population, and so regain its legitimacy in the 
voters’ eyes. 
The more important factor arises from the rise of ethnically-based, populist 
politics in the 1980s, which undercut the MNR’s traditional dominance of the rural vote, 
and posed a serious challenge to its (self-declared) role as the “natural party of 
government”.  This rural dominance was itself born out of the MNR’s agrarian reforms of 
the 1952-3 revolution.  Hence a party with a tradition of radical reform, which found 
itself in secular decline, sought a second, re-defining moment.  In a typically bold move, 
it sought to reorganize government, re-cast the relationship between citizens and the state, 
and so win back the loyalty of Bolivians living outside major cities.  To a very important 
extent, decentralization was a gambit to capture rural voters for at least another 
generation.2
 Against this background, the Bolivian decentralization reform was announced in 
1994.  The Law of Popular Participation, developed almost in secret by a small number 
of technocrats (Tuchschneider 1997), was announced to the nation to general surprise, 
then ridicule, then determined opposition from large parts of society.3  It is notable that 
opposition to the law, which was fierce for a few months, came principally from the 
teachers’ union, NGOs and other social actors, and not from political parties.  Judged by 
their public declarations, this opposition was an incoherent mix of accusations and fears 
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that denoted a deep suspicion of the government’s motives, and not a careful reading of 
the law.  The lack of opposition from parties can largely be attributed to the sweeping 
reforms that were being enacted by the MNR government at the same time as 
decentralization.  With privatization of the main state enterprises, education reform, and a 
comprehensive restructuring of the executive branch all being pushed at once, 
decentralization was relegated to the second tier of political parties’ concerns.  The 
opposition focused its attention elsewhere, and it never became a fighting point. 
First made public in January of that year, the law was promulgated by Congress in 
April and implemented from July.  The scale of the change in resource flows and political 
power that it brought about were enormous.  The core of the law consists of four points 
(Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, 1994): 
1. Resource Allocation.  Funds devolved to municipalities doubled to 20 percent of all 
national tax revenue.  More importantly, allocation amongst municipalities switched 
from unsystematic, highly political criteria to a strict per capita basis. 
2. Responsibility for Public Services.  Ownership of local infrastructure in education, 
health, irrigation, roads, sports and culture was given to municipalities, with the 
concomitant responsibility to maintain, equip and administer these facilities, and 
invest in new ones. 
3. Oversight Committees (Comités de Vigilancia) were established to provide an 
alternative channel for representing popular demand in the policy-making process. 
Composed of representatives from local, grass-roots groups, these bodies propose 
projects and oversee municipal expenditure.  Their ability to have disbursements of 
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Popular Participation funds suspended if they find funds are being misused or stolen 
can paralyze local government, and gives them real power. 
4. Municipalization.  Existing municipalities were expanded to include suburbs and 
surrounding rural areas, and 198 new municipalities (out of some 315 in all) were 
created. 
This was followed by the Law of Decentralized Administration (1995) and the Law of 
Municipalities (1999), which  further defined the municipal mandate and located it in a 
broader governmental architecture. 
 The change in local affairs that these measures catalyzed is immense.  Before 
reform local government was absent throughout the vast majority of Bolivian territory, 
and the broader state present at most in the form of a military garrison, schoolhouse or 
health post, each reporting to its respective ministry.  After reform, elected local 
governments sprouted throughout the land.  This is reflected in resources flows between 
center and periphery.  Before decentralization Bolivia’s three main cities took 86% of all 
devolved funds, while the remaining 308 municipalities divided amongst them a mere 
14%.  After decentralization the shares reversed to 27% and 73% respectively.  The per 
capita criterion resulted in a massive shift of resources to previously neglected areas.  
Amongst smaller, poorer rural districts, resource increases of 50,000 – 100,000 percent 
were quite common. 
(b) The decentralization process in Colombia 
Like Bolivia, Colombia was traditionally a highly centralized country, with 
mayors and governors directly named by central government.  Governors, in particular, 
were the President’s hombres de confianza, and carried out his will in the regions.  But 
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unlike Bolivia’s “big bang” reform, decentralization in Colombia developed over years as 
a much more gradual, incremental process.  Ceballos and Hoyos (2004) identify three 
broad phases: 
Phase 1 began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and included a number of fiscal 
measures aimed at strengthening municipal finances.  Most important of these were Law 
14 of 1983 and Law 12 of 1986, which assigned to municipalities increased powers of tax 
collection, including especially sales tax, and established parameters for the investment 
of these funds. 
Phase 2, which began in the mid-1980s, was more concerned with political and 
administrative matters.  Amongst the most important of these measures was Law 11 of 
1986, which regulated the popular election of mayors and sought to promote popular 
participation in local public decision-making via Juntas Administradoras Locales, 
amongst others.  Reforms enshrined in the 1991 constitution, such as citizens’ initiatives, 
municipal planning councils, open town meetings, the ability to revoke mayoral 
mandates, referenda, and popular consultations, further deepened political 
decentralization.  The 1991 constitution also established the popular election of 
governors. 
Phase 3 consisted of a number of laws that regulated the new constitution, and 
other fiscal and administrative reforms of the period  These laws assigned greater 
responsibility to municipalities for the provision of public services and social investment, 
and provided additional resources for the same by increasing central government 
transfers to local governments significantly.  The laws mandate that the bulk of 
transferred funds should be spent on education and health, with little discretion left to 
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local governments.  Automatic transfers to regional governments rose from about 20% to 
over 40% of total government spending, placing Colombia first in the region amongst 
countries with a unitary state, and third overall behind the two big federal countries, 
Brazil and Argentina (Alesina et al., 2000). 
The aggregate effect of two decades of political and fiscal reforms was a large 
increase in the authority and operational independence of Colombia’s municipal 
governments, accompanied by a huge rise in the resources they controlled.  
Municipalities were allowed to raise and spend significant sums of taxes, central-to-local 
government transfers increase more than three fold,4 and municipal governments were 
permitted to issue public debt.  Overall municipal expenditures and investments rose 
from 2.8% to 8.3% of GDP, as detailed in figure 1.  This rise was due entirely to 
increased investment, while running costs remained stable over the period.5
Figure 1 
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Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
 What drove decentralization in Colombia?  As befits a much longer and more 
elaborate process, we cannot limit the motivating factors of reform to a few discrete 
goals.  Ceballos and Hoyos group the many reasons into two categories.  The first of 
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these is the challenge of political instability.  Colombia is a violent country – much more 
so than Bolivia – with a long history of civil conflict, armed rebellion, persistently high 
levels of “common” crime, and the use of violence as an explicit tool of political 
mobilization.  The late 1970s saw levels of violence rise again as the internal conflict 
intensified.  At the same time, social protests and pressures from regional groups 
multiplied, linked to the central state’s inability to meet demands for social services and 
public investment.  Secondly, the political hegemony over the instruments of the state of 
the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties began to be seen more and more as a 
liability – less the solution to a previous round of civil violence (La Violencia) and more 
a cause of the next one.  Colombians from across the political spectrum became 
convinced that the inability of the state to respond to society’s demands – and its outright 
absence in many areas (the “internal frontier”), combined with the waning legitimacy of 
an arbitrarily restricted democracy,6 were leading to public sector inefficiencies, civic 
discontent, and ultimately armed violence. 
 Thus from the start decentralization in Colombia was a multi-faceted tool 
designed to serve a combination of purposes particular to Colombia’s troubled 
democracy.  Through it, policy elites sought to increase the levels of electoral and citizen 
participation within the existing institutional framework.  They sought to open the 
political system via popular elections at the regional and local levels, where they hoped 
new political movements would eventually break the liberal-conservative hegemony over 
the resources of the state.  In Colombia’s largest cities this has indeed been the case; 
elsewhere evidence is mixed (see Ceballos and Hoyos 2004). 
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3. DID DECENTRALIZATION CHANGE PUBLIC INVESTMENT?  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
(a) Data 
We analyze databases compiled for each country from official government 
statistics.  Bolivian data comes from the National Electoral Court, National Institute of 
Statistics, National Secretariat of Popular Participation, National Secretariat of Public 
Investment and External Finance, and the Social Policy Analysis Unit.  Colombian data 
comes from the Agustín Codazzi Geography Institute, National Electoral Office, National 
Planning Department, Office of the Vice Presidency, and the National Administrative 
Department of Statistics. 
Our databases cover over 90% of Colombian municipalities and the universe of 
Bolivian municipalities.  Within the Latin American context, Colombian municipal data 
are relatively abundant and detailed.7  Compiling that database was thus relatively 
straightforward.  But the same was not true for Bolivia.  Before 1994, the vast majority of 
public investment in Bolivian villages and towns was undertaken by central government.  
But financial records of these projects – voluminous and very detailed – do not include 
information on which municipality they (would eventually) belong to.  This is not 
surprising, as most municipalities did not exist even in law.  Hence local experts in 
geographic information systems were engaged to allocate the thousands of public 
investment projects in the 1987-1993 Public Sector Investment Budget to Bolivia’s 
municipalities, as created or expanded in the 1994 reform.  This data was combined with 
post-reform data reported by municipal governments to create our 1987-1996 municipal 
investment dataset. 
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For both Bolivia and Colombia, all information on budgets and financial flows is 
panel data.  Electoral data is periodic and cross-sectional.  All other data (e.g. social, 
demographic, institutional, infrastructural) is cross-sectional, from national censuses and 
other national surveys, such as the Bolivian “municipal census”, a special exercise that 
inventoried municipalities’ physical and institutional infrastructures.  Our database 
retains data integrity by source8.  We use similar variables from different sources in as 
checks on each other, in alternative specifications of the models presented in section 4.  
Our models prove robust to such tests. 
(b) Bolivia 
 The extent of the change decentralization brought about in Bolivia is perhaps best 
appreciated by examining how it changed the composition of municipal public 
investment.  Figure 2 compares investment by sector in all municipalities during the final 
three years under centralized rule (1991-3; dark bars), with decentralized investment by 
all municipalities during the first three years after reform (1994-6; light bars).  To better 
compare like with like, we omit sectors such as hydrocarbons, mining and national 
defense, which are not well suited to local government action (and remained the 
responsibility of central government in Bolivia).  The differences are large.  In the years 
leading up to reform, central government invested most in transport, energy and 
multisectoral,9 which together accounted for 65% of public investment during 1991-3.  
After decentralization, local governments invest most heavily in education, urban 
development, and water & sanitation, together accounting for 79% of municipal 
investment.  Of the top three sectors in both cases, accounting for the great majority of 
total investment, central and local government have not one in common.  The evidence 
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implies that local and central government have very different investment priorities.  
Decentralizing power and resources to municipal governments is associated with a shift 
in public investment away from economic production and infrastructure, and into social 
services and human capital formation. 
Figure 2 
Central vs. Local Government Investment (Bolivia)
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Source: National Secretariat of Public Investment and External Finance; original calculations. 
 
 Consider also how investment was distributed geographically among Bolivia’s 
municipalities before and after decentralization.  Figure 3 shows quasi-histograms of total 
investment in all of Bolivia’s municipalities in per-capita terms, again for the last three 
years under centralized rule vs. the first three years of decentralization.  The vertical bars 
measure the proportion of Bolivia’s municipalities that received investments in the given 
ranges.  The chart shows that central government invested very unequally, with almost 
half of all municipalities receiving nothing while a small number received huge sums 
(over Bs.50,000/capita in one case), and the mean well outside the modal range.  Under 
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local government, by contrast, investment was much more equal: No districts received 
zero and none received more than Bs.620/capita, the modal range contains the mean, and 
the standard deviation is 97% lower than central government’s.  Closer inspection of the 
leftmost column (“=0”) in the left-hand chart below reveals that it is composed 
overwhelmingly of the smallest, poorest, most rural districts.  These are the 
municipalities that were most affected by decentralization. 
Figure 3: Distribution of Central and Local Government Investment by Amount 
Local Government Investment (s.d. = Bs.90/capita)
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Source: National Secretariat of Public Investment and External Finance; original calculations.  Note irregular outer intervals. 
 
So decentralization seems to have changed the sectoral uses of investment and its 
distribution across space.  Did its effects run any deeper?  Figure 4 plots education 
investment under central and local government (three-year totals again) vs. local illiteracy 
rates for all of Bolivia’s municipalities.  We use the illiteracy rate as a proxy for a 
district’s need for more education investment.10  The most striking thing about the left-
hand plot is how few nonzero observations there are before decentralization – only 15% 
of districts recorded any investment at all under central government.  The regression line 
is negative with a modest slope, although not quite significant at the 10% level (probably 
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because of so few non-zero observations).  Contrast that with decentralized government, 
where 97% of districts invested in the sector, amounts are larger across the board, and the 
regression line on illiteracy is positively sloped and significant at the 1% level.  
Decentralization appears to have transformed education policy from one that ignored 
most municipalities in order to focus resources in those best-provided, to one that 
invested essentially everywhere, focusing resources where existing levels of education 
were worst.  Section 5 looks at this question much more rigorously. 
Figure 4: Education Investment vs. Illiteracy 
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Sources: National Institute of Statistics, National Secretariat of Popular Participation, National Secretariat of Public 
Investment and External Finance; original calculations. 
 (c) Colombia 
Detailed municipal-level expenditure and investment data are available for 
Colombia only from 1994.  Hence we cannot examine investment priorities under a 
relatively “pure” centralized regime (i.e. which ended in the mid-1970s), as we did for 
Bolivia.  But the characteristics of Colombia’s reform process, marked by gradualism and 
long-term change, make this less of a problem.  As discussed above, a number of key 
decentralizing mechanisms, such as citizens’ initiatives, referenda, mayoral recall, and 
increased resource transfers, were only put in place with the 1991 constitutional reform and 
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accompanying regulations.  These transferred resources and authority to municipalities 
gradually over time.  Hence the outlines of Colombia’s decentralization “package” became 
fully clear only in 1992-93, setting off a process that deepened thereafter.  Indeed, the 
empirical measures of decentralization that we use below all show monotonically increasing 
levels of decentralization throughout the period 1994-2004.  Hence hereafter we treat 1993-
94 as years with relatively high centralization, and 2003-04 as years with relatively high 
decentralization. 
How did decentralization affect public investment patterns?  In order to examine 
the investment priorities of central vs. local government as closely as we can, figure 5 
compares central government investment in 1994 with local government investment of 
own resources (i.e. local taxes and charges) in 2003.11  As for Bolivia, the differences are 
large.  Central government’s largest category, at 38% of the total, is infrastructure, 
whereas local government’s largest is health, followed by education, which together 
comprise 81% of the local investment budget.  The broader pattern of dark and light bars 
in figure 5 shows a clear shift in public sector priorities, and resources, away from 
infrastructure and industry and commerce, into health, education, and water and 
sanitation.  The similarity with Bolivia is striking. 
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Figure 5 
Central vs. Local Government Investment (Colombia)
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Education
Health
Water and Sanitation
Infrastructure
Industry and Commerce
Culture
Se
ct
or
Percent of Total
Central
Local
 
Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
With respect to the geographic distribution of investment, figure 6 provides 
histograms of the public investment in Colombia’s municipalities in 1994 vs. 2003.  
Amounts are given in constant 2002 pesos per capita, again divided by source between 
central and local governments.  As decentralization deepened, both central and local 
investment became more dispersed, especially in the upper tails.  This implies increasing 
inequality in investment, with some municipalities receiving much greater per capita 
sums than the norm.  Both means rose significantly over the period, by 53% in the case of 
central government, and 105% for local government, implying that districts benefited 
quite significantly from increasing levels of investment by both central and local 
governments.  Standard deviations were quite similar for central and local government in 
each period.  The charts show clearly that the major differences are between 1994 and 
2003, and not between center and periphery. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Central and Local Government Investment by Amount 
Central Government, 2003 (s.d. = $80,726/capita)
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Central Government, 1994 (s.d. = $51,093/capita)
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Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
Lastly, is there any evidence that these broad changes in resource flows affected 
development outcomes of interest?  We focus again on education, and in particular on 
school attendance figures.  Figure 7 shows enrollment data for the period in question, for 
both public and private schools, with enrollment in 1994 indexed to 1.  At the outset, 
public and private enrollment trends are quite similar.  After 1996 an increasing gap 
opens up between them, although they continue to trend up and down in parallel.  After 
1999, however, the slopes diverge, leading to a large gap between the two educational 
systems.  Decentralization seems to coincide with a 20 percent increase in school 
enrollment.  The concentration of improvement in public schools, where enrollment 
increased 30 percent while the private system’s fell seven percent, suggests that local 
governments may have been able to run schools and promote attendance better than 
central government had before.  But such descriptive evidence is far from conclusive.  
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We return to this question with much more rigor in section 5.  But before we can do so, 
we must lay out our methodology. 
Figure 7: Decentralization and School Enrollment 
Index of Public and Private School Enrollment
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Source: National Planning Department; original calculations. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The evidence thus far suggests that decentralization changed both countries’ 
public investment patterns in important ways, and may have improved the targeting of 
public services as well.  But stronger evidence is needed if we are to reach firm 
conclusions.  Ideally such a comparison would be based on very similar regression 
equations for both countries.  But the different nature of reform in the two countries – a 
massive decentralization shock versus more gradual reform – demands that we use 
different empirical approaches, even though we ask similar questions of each case.  In 
addition, there is simply more and higher-quality data available for Colombia, which 
allows us to push the analysis further into the realm of public sector outputs.  Hence for 
Colombia we investigate decentralization’s effect on the number of children attending 
public schools.  For Bolivia, the data restricts us to examining whether decentralization 
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made investment allocations more responsive to local need.12  Due to space constraints, 
we present detailed results for education only.  It is worth mentioning that we have 
similar estimations for health and water and sanitation in both countries, and for urban 
development and agriculture in Bolivia as well.  Those findings are closely consistent 
with the results presented below. 
(a) Bolivia 
We need an empirical strategy that can cope with the generalized shock to Bolivia 
of reform.  Our aim is to test whether decentralization made public investment more 
responsive to local needs.  This can be separated into two questions: (i) did public sector 
investment patterns change with decentralization? and if so, (ii) do indicators of need 
determine that change?  The problem with asking such questions for Bolivia is the 
absolute lack of time-series data for social, demographic, and institutional variables.  
How can we investigate decentralization’s effects given good time-series data on national 
and local investment flows, but cross-sectional-only data for other variables?  One of the 
main contributions of this paper is to provide a methodology for doing so, which is as 
follows. 
Using the panel data described above, we estimate the model 
 Gmt = β1αm + β2α*m + β3δt + εmt (1) 
where Gmt denotes public investment by sector (Education, Health, etc.) in each locality, 
αm and δt are vectors of state and year dummy variables, and α*m = αmDt, where Dt is a 
decentralization dummy variable that takes the values 0 before 1994 and 1 after, 
subscripted by municipality m and year t.13  Investment patterns are thus decomposed 
into three terms: a year effect, δt, which captures year shocks and time-specific 
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characteristics; a state effect, αm, which captures all of the characteristics of a state fixed 
in time; and a decentralization-interacted state effect, α*m, which captures state-specific 
characteristics that begin in 1994. 
Any systemic changes in Bolivia’s politics or economy that affect all 
municipalities similarly, such as a national policy initiative or an external shock, will be 
captured by the year term, δt.  Effects related to municipalities’ fixed characteristics, such 
as their size, location, or environment, will be captured by the state term, αm.  And any 
locally-specific effects that kick in only after decentralization are captured by the α* 
term.  Knowing what we do about Bolivia as described in section 2(a), the most 
reasonable interpretation of this last term is that it captures two kinds of effects: (i) local 
governments, local civic associations and other local institutions created by the reform, 
and (ii) pre-existing local actors and forces made relevant by decentralization – that is to 
say, those able to affect policy-making at the local, but not central, level.  Note that this is 
so by construction, and not by assumption.  We use Tobit estimations for equation (1). 
 Because αm and α*m are dummy variables, one for each of Bolivia’s 310 
municipalities, equation (1) will produce 310 separate β1’s, and 310 β2’s.  We then 
perform three tests: 
1. β1 = β2   A t-test of whether the means of the coefficients of αm and α*m are 
significantly different, for each sector.  We interpret significance as evidence that 
decentralization changed national investment patterns through the actions of local 
governments and newly-empowered local actors. 
2. β1m = β2m   An F-test of whether the coefficients of αm and α*m are different 
municipality by municipality.  Significance implies that decentralization changed 
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local investment patterns in a particular municipality.  Significance in many 
municipalities constitutes stronger evidence that decentralization changed national 
investment patterns in that sector. 
3. Lastly, we use the values of β1m and β2m to estimate the model 
β2m – β1m = ζSm + ηZm + γPm + εm (2) 
where the LHS is the differences in state dummy coefficients from equation (1), S is a 
vector of the existing stock of public services at an initial period; Z is a vector of 
measures of civil institutions, private sector dynamism, and municipal project 
planning procedures, all local and only relevant after decentralization; and P is a 
vector of political participation and the prevalence of left-wing ideology.  All are 
indexed by municipality m.  This approach isolates the changes in investment patterns 
resulting from decentralization, and then examines their determinants. 
By construction, β2m – β1m should be unrelated to all factors which remain constant 
between the two periods, and thus we omit socio-economic, regional and other variables 
that do not change with decentralization.  Our interpretation of the term is that it captures 
the effects on investment patterns of the new institutions and political economy dynamics 
created by decentralization, net of municipalities’ fixed characteristics, such as size, 
region, ethnic composition, etc.  Given the lack of time series data on Z and S variables, 
an additional advantage of our methodology is that it provides a natural way to hold these 
terms constant in equation (2).  We will interpret S as an indicator of need at an initial 
period (see below), and so it is reasonable to hold it constant.  It is less satisfying to hold 
Z constant, although the briefness of the period in question, 1994-1996, makes this less 
problematic than it may initially seem.14  We report results for tests 1 and 2 for 10 sectors 
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(as defined by Bolivia’s finance ministry).  We report results from test 3 only for 
education. 
 There are literally dozens of variables that might be included in the Z vector, 
covering such specific items as municipal employee characteristics and decision-making 
processes, and how investment projects are planned and written into the local budget.15  
We use principal component analysis to reduce a large set of very specific Z-type 
variables into a smaller number of indicators that are conceptually coherent.  The 
objective of this technique is to find the unit-length combinations of explanatory 
variables with highest variance.  We follow Maddala (1977) and Greene (1997) in 
calculating variables z1 to zk where z is a linear combination of explanatory (x) variables 
 z1 = a1x1 + a2x2 + … + aLxL
 z2 = b1x1 + b2x2 + … + bLxL    etc. 
ranked in order of variance, with highest first.  Principal component analysis regresses y 
on z1, z2, …, zk, where k < L and z’s are constructed so as to be orthogonal.  So long as 
the z’s chosen represent combinations of variables that can be interpreted meaningfully, 
this provides a method for estimating parsimonious models with limited loss of 
information.  We construct principal component variables (PCVs) for three categories of 
explanatory variables, and use the largest eigenvector for each (i.e. z1).  These are 
characterized as follows: 
Principal Component Variables 
 
Category Interpretation: Variable increases in… 
Private sector Dynamism of the local private sector 
Project planning Informed project planning that follows open and 
 consensual procedures 
Civil institutions Strength of local civil institutions and organizations 
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 The main variable of interest in test 3 is S, which we interpret as a district’s need 
for additional public investment at the outset of decentralization.  We use three measures 
of illiteracy and literacy rates, plus the existence of a functioning local education 
authority, as rough indicators of the level of education provision in each municipality.  
Assuming that the marginal utility of a public service falls as the level of that service 
rises, we interpret high illiteracy (low literacy) rates as indicative of a greater need for 
additional education investment.  The existence of a properly constituted local education 
authority similarly indicates higher provision, and hence lower need.  We thus expect 
coefficient ζ to be positive when illiteracy rates are used, and negative when the literacy 
rate is used.  This would imply that decentralization led government to invest more 
heavily in places where initial levels of education were low.  A positive coefficient, by 
contrast, would imply that decentralization accentuated educational disparities, as better 
provided municipalities received higher levels of additional investment. 
 The variables in Z are not only controls.  Their coefficients, η, are of interest 
insofar as they help explain the mechanisms by which local government is more (or less) 
responsive than central government to real local need.  The case put forward by political 
scientists16 for local government’s superior assessment of local preferences includes 
greater sensitivity to grass-roots demand, greater accessibility of local lobby groups to 
local government, and greater political accountability to the local populace.  Some of the 
ways in which this can happen include the use of open, informed planning techniques, 
and the existence of private sector and civic organizations that are strong and dynamic.  
Remember that such local factors were not relevant to central decision-making, which 
occurred at the center.  Variables P capture another local feature that changed 
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significantly with decentralization: the power of relatively small groups of voters to 
influence policy makers’ decisions via local elections.  We expect districts where 
electoral participation increased with decentralization to be less subject to the sort of elite 
capture that Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) analyze.  And left-wing parties’ share of the 
vote captures an underlying local ideological characteristic that should increase education 
investment independently of need. 
(b) Colombia 
Reform in Colombia was more gradual, phased in over a number of years.  We 
take advantage of this to construct continuous variables that capture advancing reform in 
Colombia, and use panel estimations that incorporate much more information than is 
possible for Bolivia.  And as noted above, the availability of higher-quality data further 
allows us to investigate decentralization’s effects on real policy outputs, and not just 
changes in resource inputs.  Section 3 showed that decentralization in Colombia was 
associated with a marked increase in the number of state-school students.  In order to 
investigate this relationship more rigorously, we estimate the model 
 ΔSmt = α + ζDmt + βRmt + γPmt + δCmt + εmt (3) 
where ΔS is the year-on-year increase in student enrollment in state schools, D is a vector 
of measures of where municipalities lie on the decentralization-centralization continuum, 
R is a vector of measures of resource availability (i.e. supply factors) that might 
independently increase student enrollment, P is a vector of variables measuring political 
participation and engagement, and C is a vector of socioeconomic and geographic 
controls, all indexed by municipality m and year t. 
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Our measures of decentralization, D, are based on municipal expenditures in 
education broken down by source of revenue.  They measure different levels of autonomy 
in municipal decision-making and resource commitment.  The first is own resources – 
revenue raised from local taxes and charges – as a share of total expenditure.  Such funds 
have no strings attached, and are at the free disposal of local governments to spend as 
they like.  The second variable, Municipal Independence, is the product of a dummy 
variable that records which municipalities are “certified”, multiplied by the resource 
transfers that certification triggers to each municipality.  Certified municipalities receive 
transfers directly from central government, and not via the departmental (i.e. regional) 
level.  Departments have discretion in how they pass on funds destined for municipal 
uses, and so certified municipalities are more independent of departmental influence and 
meddling.  By interacting the certification dummy with resource flows, we generate an 
indicator that can distinguish relatively small differences in municipal discretion and 
independence.  Local governments that score higher in these two variables are 
substantively more decentralized than the rest. 
The third variable records the share of total educational expenditure accounted for 
by central transfers allocated according to poverty indices, for the period 1994-2001.17  In 
2001, Law 715 changed this allocation mechanism to one based on the number of state 
school students.  Hence the fourth D variable, which records central transfers based on 
student numbers as a share of total expenditure, for the period 2002-04.  Municipalities 
with higher values in these indicators face stronger incentives set by the center, and are 
thus much more “centralized”.  The coefficients of these four D variables, ζ1... ζ4 are our 
 29
main interest in this regression.  If decentralization drives increases in enrollment, then 
we would expect ζ1 and ζ2 to be positive, and ζ3 and ζ4 to be negative. 
Other factors which might affect student enrollment independently of 
decentralization include how richly a municipality funds its schools, and the general 
buoyancy of municipal revenues.  We control for such effects with R, which includes two 
terms for municipalities’ general expenditure growth (separated into the periods before 
and after Law 715), a term for per capita expenditure on public education, and one for the 
student-teacher ratio. 
Political controls P include overall turnout, the mayor’s electoral support, a 
dummy variable indicating electoral years, and the share of total municipal personnel 
who are university graduates, as a measure of local government’s institutional capacity.  
Lastly, the variables in C control for municipal size, wealth, inequality, unemployment, 
and what region it is in, as well as the 1999 recession.  We also include measures of a 
municipality’s displaced population, separated between those that receive migratory 
flows and those that expel them, as rough proxies for how much a locality has been 
impacted by Colombia’s armed conflict.  Two final terms, the gross enrollment rate and 
the proportion of the school-age population attending private education, capture level 
effects and complementarities between public and private enrollment. 
The specification in (3) is based on the theory that a given level of expenditure 
will produce improved outputs when allocated and executed locally rather than centrally.  
In this case, outputs are measured as student enrollment rates, and inputs are measured as 
locally-controlled resources.  But there is the possibility of the opposite relationship, and 
hence endogeneity, if instead it is increasing enrollment rates that are causing 
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municipalities to spend more of their own resources on education.  Hence we also 
estimate equation (3) instrumenting for D1 with the log of local tax revenues per capita in 
periods t-1 and t-2.  The economic logic for this instrument is that lagged per capita taxes 
should have a high correlation with Own Resources/Total Education Expenditures, but a 
low correlation with increases in student enrollment.  This is because there is no sense in 
which the level of local taxes per capita should be associated with changes in school 
enrollments.  Pairwise correlations of the variables bear this out, with ten-fold difference 
in the respective correlations.  We use 2SLS panel estimations.18  A Sargan test confirms 
that lagged per-capita taxes are suitable instruments for the share of own resources in 
total education spending.  Both sets of results are presented below. 
5. DECENTRALIZATION’S EFFECTS – MORE RIGOROUS EVIDENCE 
This section lays out econometric evidence that decentralization made public 
investment in education more responsive to real local needs in Bolivia, and led to 
substantive improvements in service delivery in Colombia. 
(a) Bolivia 
Figure 8 shows the results for tests 1 and 2.  Using national mean values, the null 
hypothesis, β1 = β2, can be rejected for eight of the 10 sectors tested.  Only in health and 
energy did decentralization appear to make no difference to public investment patterns.  
Test 2 shows the number of municipalities where we can reject the hypothesis β1m = β2m.  
Five sectors pass this more demanding test: education, water & sanitation, agriculture, 
urban development and water management.  In three sectors, β1 ≠ β2 with high levels of 
confidence when national means are used, whereas using local values, β1m = β2m almost 
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everywhere.  This combination of results implies that reform led to very large shifts in 
investment flows in a small number of municipalities, and insignificant changes 
everywhere else. 
Individual Municipality
Test Test Tests Significant, by
Sector  β2−β1 t-statistic P Value Number Percent
Education 0.01558 22.798 0.0000 209 71%
Water & Sanitation -0.01548 -17.343 0.0000 224 76%
Agriculture -0.01402 -8.667 0.0000 65 22%
Urban Development 0.00484 5.324 0.0000 107 36%
Water Management 0.00107 2.932 0.0034 105 36%
Transport -0.10616 -5.967 0.0000 29 10%
Communication -0.00246 -4.011 0.0001 7 2%
Industry & Tourism -0.00171 -3.768 0.0002 7 2%
Health -0.00117 -1.540 0.1238 49 17%
Energy -0.00475 -1.281 0.2004 7 2%
Test 1 Test 2
National Means
 
N = 295 for all sectors 
Figure 8: Did decentralization change Bolivian investment patterns? 
So decentralization is associated with changes in national investment patterns, and 
these changes were strongest in education, water, urban development and agriculture.  
Section 3 showed that education’s share of local investment rose impressively after 
decentralization, and test 1 concurs.  Was this rise a function of local educational need?  
Test 3 explores this question by investigating the determinants of the difference in state 
dummy variables, β2m – β1m, equivalent to the investment increase attributable to 
decentralization (see figure 9). 
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Test 3: β2m– β1m = ζSm + ηZm + γPm + εm
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4
Illiteracy Rate (Adult) 0.00017 *** 0.0001637 **
(2.910) (2.020)
Illiteracy Rate (Over-6) 0.0001838 **
(2.500)
Literacy Rate -0.000106 *
-1.84
Local Education Authority 0.0056 0.0054333 0.005337 0.0060453
(1.420) (1.380) (1.360) (1.350)
Civil Institutions PCV 0.00097 * 0.0010271 * 0.0010123 * 0.0009862
(1.750) (1.840) (1.770) (1.540)
Private Sector PCV -0.00098 ** -0.00106 *** -0.001211 *** -0.000851 **
(-2.470) (-2.690) (-3.000) (-2.100)
Project Planning PCV -0.00054 -0.000548 -0.000488 -0.000537
(-0.920) (-0.930) (-0.830) (-0.910)
Change in Electoral -2.55E-05 (*)
 Absenteeism (1993-95) (-1.620)
Left-Wing Parties Share -0.000128
of the Vote, 1995 (-0.860)
constant 0.00758 * 0.0080641 * 0.0203711 *** 0.0101111 ***
(1.810) (1.820) (3.730) (3.650)
R-squared 0.0176 0.0162 0.0136 0.021
Prob > F 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001
N 295 295 295 291
OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses
PCV1 = 1st pricipal component variable
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
Model
 
Figure 9: Decentralization's Effect on Education Investment in Bolivia 
 Under decentralization, investment rises as illiteracy rises and as literacy falls.  
This implies that local governments invested more than central government in education 
services in places where the stock of education was lower.  The existence of a functioning 
local education authority appears to have no effect.  These results are insensitive to 
different measures of illiteracy, and to different specifications, as figure 9 shows.  Hence 
in a context of rising education investment nationwide, municipalities where education 
indicators were disproportionately poor made disproportionately large investments in 
new or improved schooling.  Conversely, those where education indicators were 
unusually good saw increases below the mean, choosing instead to prioritize other 
 33
sectors.19  We interpret this as evidence that decentralization made education investment 
more responsive to real local need than it had been under central government. 
 Education investment rises where civil institutions are more vigorous, but falls 
where the private sector is stronger.  Both institutional features are examples of local 
actors that would have had almost no voice under centralized policy making, but whose 
influence was greatly increased by decentralization.  We interpret these results as a sign 
of local political competition between opposing forces: on one hand grass roots civic 
support for better education services – i.e. parents worried about their children; and on 
the other, private firms lobbying for resources to flow to other sectors where they stand to 
profit more.20  Informed, participative project planning methodologies appear to have no 
effect.  Left-wing parties’ share of the vote is also insignificant.  The change in electoral 
absenteeism has the expected sign, and is thus consistent with the civil institutions 
variable, but is not significant at the 10% level.  These results confirm those of Faguet 
(2004) and extend them with the inclusion of political variables. 
(b) Colombia 
 Our results from estimating equation (3) appear in figure 10.  Model 1 is a panel 
(OLS) estimation.  Model 2 is an IV estimation, instrumenting for own resources with the 
level of lagged per capita taxes.  Models 3 and 4 provide IV estimates of the same model 
for municipalities with fewer than 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, allowing us to focus on 
smaller, overwhelmingly rural localities.  A Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
confirms that instruments and residuals are uncorrelated, and hence lagged local taxes are 
associated with exogenous variation in own resources.  First-stage regressions for the IV 
models are provided in the appendix. 
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1 2 3 4
IV IV IV
Independent Variable OLS
Full 
Sample
Sample:    
< 20,000 
Inhabitants
Sample:    
< 50,000 
Inhabitants
Own Resources/ 0.105*** 0.484*** 0.570*** 0.471***
Total Education Expenditures [5.76] [4.46] [3.90] [3.67]
Municipal Independence+ 0.035*** 0.068***
[4.12] [5.15]
Statutory Transfers (Poverty)/ -0.112*** -0.004 0.016 -0.018
Total Education Expenditures [7.55] [0.11] [0.35] [0.44]
Statutory Transfers (No. of students)/ -0.153*** -0.080*** -0.082** -0.104***
Total Education Expenditures [6.69] [2.67] [2.06] [3.01]
Municipal Expenditure Growth 0.153*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.143***
[18.15] [15.00] [10.35] [14.14]
Per Capita Expenditure on -0.107*** -0.115*** -0.121*** -0.119***
Public Education (Ln) [17.52] [15.64] [14.70] [16.15]
Student/Teacher Ratio (lagged) -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002***
[3.09] [3.05] [2.49] [2.92]
Electoral Turnout 0.018** 0.012 0.017 0.015
[2.06] [1.28] [1.42] [1.55]
Mayor's Electoral Support  0.044*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.044***
[4.41] [4.16] [3.81] [4.08]
Electoral year 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
[0.32] [0.87] [0.41] [0.54]
University Graduates as a Share of 0.020* 0.005 -0.014 0.005
Municipal Personnel [1.78] [0.40] [0.96] [0.36]
Population (Ln) -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.023***
[10.47] [8.75] [7.34] [8.36]
Gini Coefficient -0.018** -0.033*** -0.039*** -0.032***
[2.06] [3.42] [2.83] [2.86]
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.046***
[5.91] [6.06] [3.79] [6.31]
Displaced Population, Receiving -0.078 -0.067 0.039 -0.062
Municipalities [0.49] [0.41] [0.21] [0.37]
Displaced Population, Expelling -0.208*** -0.198*** -0.223*** -0.183***
Municipalities [3.08] [2.98] [2.80] [2.70]
Unemployment Rate (Departmental) -0.008 -0.006 0.016 -0.001
[0.45] [0.37] [0.56] [0.05]
1999 Year Dummy 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.054***
[13.38] [13.15] [10.49] [12.41]
Public-School Gross Enrollment Rate -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.046***
 (lagged) (% of School-Age Population) [11.65] [11.59] [9.33] [10.97]
Private Enrollment Rate (% of School-A 0.415*** 0.303*** 0.239*** 0.280***
Pop. in Private Schools) (Ln, lagged) [6.99] [4.85] [2.77] [3.90]
Political Variables
Socioeconomic and Regional Variables
Instrumenting for Own Resources
Dependent Variable: Increase in Student Enrollment in Public Schools
Model
Decentralization Variables
Resource Availability Variables
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Andean Regional Dummy -0.105*** -0.035 -0.005 -0.012
[3.14] [0.85] [0.59] [1.55]
Caribbean Regional Dummy -0.126*** -0.06 -0.032*** -0.036***
[3.74] [1.47] [3.53] [4.83]
Eastern Regional Dummy -0.082** -0.024
[2.42] [0.60]
Pacific Regional Dummy -0.092*** -0.02 0.021** 0.006
[2.74] [0.49] [1.99] [0.74]
Amazonia Regional Dummy -0.043 0.031 0.072*** 0.056***
[1.25] [0.71] [3.80] [4.06]
Constant 1.807*** 1.809*** 1.975*** 1.900***
[17.03] [15.64] [14.86] [16.71]
Observations 10292 10292 6548 9205
Sargan statistic 1.082 0.399 1.436
Chi-square p-value 0.29822 0.52773 0.23086
Panel regressions with robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses
Model 2, 3 & 4 instrument for own resources using lagged per capita taxes (Ln) 
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
+ No municipalities below 50,000 inhabitants have been certified "independent" yet.  
Figure 10: Decentralization’s Effect on Public School Enrollment in Colombia 
 Both measures of strong decentralization are positive and significant at the 1% 
level in all the models.  This implies strong evidence that public school enrollment rises 
as the share of own resources in total education expenditures rises, and when 
municipalities are more independent.  Interestingly, the effect appears to be larger in the 
smallest municipalities.  By contrast, ζ3 and ζ4 are negative and significant at the 1% 
level in four of the models, and at the 5% level in a fifth.  This implies that where central 
transfers form a large part of total expenditures, and hence municipalities face strong 
incentives set by the center, public enrollment falls, although the evidence is less strong 
than for the previous finding.  We interpret this as evidence that decentralization of 
education has led to improved educational outcomes in Colombia, in the sense of more 
students attending school.  By contrast, in those places where central control persists, 
outcomes appear to have worsened. 
 Supply-side measures of resources availability are all strongly significant.  They 
show that enrollment increases as expenditure grows, and falls with the student-teacher 
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ratio, as one would expect.  Curiously, the per capita expenditure term is also negative, 
and the evidence for this is quite strong.  This implies that raising student numbers are 
not a simple question of increasing the education budget, but rather based on other 
factors, such as how and where funds are invested.  These findings are robust to different 
specifications/instrumentation. 
 Amongst our political controls, electoral support for the mayor is positive and 
strongly significant in all four models, implying a larger effect on enrollment in places 
where the mayor has strong political backing.  Electoral turnout is significant at the 5% 
level only in the OLS model.  And there is essentially no evidence that the quality of 
local government’s human resources matters. 
Amongst socioeconomic and geographic controls, results of interest include the 
first three coefficients, implying that districts that are smaller, relatively more equal, and 
with a higher level of unsatisfied basic needs saw greater increases in enrollment.  These 
results hold, or even increase, amongst smaller municipalities.  Public enrollment also 
rises with the share of students attending private schools, indicating complementarity 
between the public and private education systems.  This contradicts the impression of 
substitution between public and private enrollment implied in figure 7.  Decentralization 
appears not to improve public schooling at the expense of private schools, but rather to 
promote the idea of education more generally.  Other control variables capturing the 
impact of Colombia’s armed violence, the 1999 recession, level effects, and a district’s 
region are also significant. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence from Bolivia and Colombia is consistent with some of the central 
claims in favor of decentralization.  In both countries decentralization appears to have 
shifted public investment patterns in important ways, switching resources out of 
infrastructure and industry, and into primary social services such as education and water 
& sanitation.  The evidence for Bolivia suggests that public investment in education 
became more responsive to real local needs, rising disproportionately in areas with the 
worst education indicators.  As an implicit targeting strategy this is efficient, and 
probably served to improve educational outcomes, especially in rural areas.  
Unfortunately, data constraints do not allow us to test that theory. 
But we can for the case of Colombia, and the results are strong: decentralization 
improved enrollment rates in public schools.  In districts where educational finance and 
policy making were under greater local control, enrollment increased.  In districts where 
educational finance was still based on centrally-controlled criteria, enrollment fell.  
Further evidence suggests that this was not the simple result of increasing financing 
levels, but due instead to the quality of investment that municipalities achieved – to how 
and where funds were spent.  Of course, enrollment is only a proximate educational 
outcome; deeper outcomes of interest include literacy, numeracy and standardized test 
results.  Current data limitations prevent us from using such variables here.  Based on the 
results above, however, we would expect to see improving literacy rates as a result of 
decentralizing education in the medium to long term. 
It is striking that in both countries, the major policy changes identified were 
driven by the behavior of the smallest, poorest, most rural municipalities.  To understand 
this properly, we must place it in the context of what came before.  In Bolivia, central 
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government traditionally ignored small, rural districts, whereas in Colombia the center 
invested much more equitably prior to reform.  In both countries, decentralization 
empowered the smallest, poorest districts disproportionately, and their collective 
response altered national investment patterns.  But decentralization in Bolivia included a 
huge fiscal equalization shock, which led to much larger changes in the uses and spatial 
distribution of national investment than for Colombia. 
This underlines an important point that is often ignored: decentralization is not a 
program, but rather a process that relocates power and resources from officials at the 
center to others at the periphery.  Its effects depend very much on the character of central 
decision-making – on how the center used its power and resources – before reform began.  
Even the most transparent, well-meaning local administrations might find it difficult to 
improve upon the performance of a central government that was effective and well-
informed. 
But performance did improve, at least in education.  In Bolivia public investment 
became more responsive to local needs, and in Colombia more children went to school.  
These substantive, localized improvements are at least in part due to the new incentives 
reform put in place.  Before decentralization, central officials stationed beyond national 
and regional capitals had little reason to concern themselves with local demands.  Career 
success was determined by ministerial fiat unrelated to local outcomes in distant districts.  
Throughout most of each country, ordinary citizens’ ordinary concerns were given little 
attention.  Decentralization changed this by creating local authorities beholden to local 
voters.  Nationwide, it put real power over public resources in the hands of ordinary 
citizens.  And it changed the way both countries are run. 
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Appendix 
First-stage regressions of Own Resources/Total Education Expenditures
1 2 3
IV IV IV
Independent Variable
Full 
Sample
Sample:    
< 20,000 
Inhabitants
Sample:    
< 50,000 
Inhabitants
 lagged 1 per capita taxes (Ln) 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
[3.79] [3.19] [3.35]
 lagged 2 per capita taxes (Ln) 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008***
[5.00] [3.25] [4.21]
Municipal Independence+ -0.089***
[17.60]
Statutory Transfers (Poverty)/ -0.278*** -0.312*** -0.295***
Total Education Expenditures [32.49] [28.69] [32.84]
Statutory Transfers (No. of students)/ -0.192*** -0.217*** -0.206***
Total Education Expenditures [12.30] [10.18] [12.31]
Municipal Expenditure Growth 0.020*** 0.010** 0.012***
[5.54] [2.15] [3.32]
Per Capita Expenditure on 0.022*** 0.035*** 0.025***
Public Education (Ln) [3.13] [4.18] [3.73]
Student/Teacher Ratio (lagged) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[3.95] [3.26] [3.80]
Electoral Turnout 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019***
[4.15] [2.95] [3.59]
Mayor's Electoral Support  0.008* 0.011** 0.010**
[1.69] [2.07] [2.07]
Electoral year 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009***
[4.90] [4.81] [5.78]
University Graduates as a Share of 0.040*** 0.015* 0.026***
Municipal Personnel [6.21] [1.82] [3.82]
Population (Ln) -0.007*** -0.017*** -0.013***
[6.13] [8.59] [9.95]
Gini Coefficient 0.010* 0.022*** 0.023***
[1.71] [2.97] [3.88]
Unsatisfied Basic Needs 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.037***
[7.44] [6.87] [8.64]
Displaced Population, Receiving -0.052 0.039 -0.034
Municipalities [0.72] [0.48] [0.47]
Displaced Population, Expelling -0.023 -0.019 -0.021
Municipalities [1.13] [0.76] [1.08]
Unemployment Rate (Departmental) -0.004 -0.017* -0.014**
[0.60] [1.77] [2.18]
1999 Year Dummy -0.001 0.001 0.0003
[0.30] [0.35] [0.17]
Socioeconomic and Regional Variables
Instrumental Variables
Instrumenting for Own Resources
Decentralization Variables
Resource Availability Variables
Political Variables
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Public-School Gross Enrollment Rate -0.004** -0.009*** -0.005***
 (lagged) (% of School-Age Population) [2.06] [3.62] [2.60]
Private Enrollment Rate (% of School-A 0.186*** 0.027 0.144***
Pop. in Private Schools) (Ln, lagged) [5.29] [0.75] [3.64]
Andean Regional Dummy -0.178*** 0.016*** -0.029***
[6.01] [3.57] [6.97]
Caribbean Regional Dummy -0.157*** 0.039*** -0.010**
[5.26] [6.10] [2.14]
Eastern Regional Dummy -0.149*** 0.052***
[4.98] [8.41]
Pacific Regional Dummy -0.176*** 0.018*** -0.030***
[5.92] [3.72] [6.86]
Amazonia Regional Dummy -0.196*** -0.044***
[6.58] [8.52]
Constant 0.076 0.113 0.078
[1.11] [1.44] [1.29]
Observations 10294 6550 9207
R-squared 0.27 0.3 0.28
Panel regressions with robust standard errors; t-statistics in parentheses
*, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
+ No municipalities below 50,000 inhabitants are yet certified "independent".  
                                                 
NOTES 
1 Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003), p.1010. 
2 At the time MNR strategists gleefully predicted such a result.  They proved wrong. 
3 “Injertos Tramposos en ‘Participación Popular’”, Hoy, January 19, 1994; “La Declaratoria de Guerra del 
Primer Mandatario”, La Razon, January 27, 1994; and “Arrogancia Insultante”, Presencia, February 27, 
1994 are only three of the many articles which appeared in the Bolivian press documenting popular 
reaction to the “Damned Law”.  These are documented in Unidad de Comunicación (1995). 
4 Sánchez (2000) shows that central transfers grew from 2% of GDP in 1990 to almost 7% in 1997. 
5 Colombia’s public accounts classify such items as teachers’ and health workers’ salaries as investments, 
and not running costs. 
6 The Frente Nacional (1957-74) quelled La Violencia by sharing out the fruits of power equally between 
Liberals and Conservatives, and restricting electoral competition to those two parties. 
7 In the sense that more data on more local characteristics are collected in Colombia than any other country 
in the region bar Brazil. 
8 Meaning we do not combine information from different sources into a single variable. 
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9 A hodgepodge, including feasibility studies, technical assistance and emergency relief, that is difficult to 
categorize. 
10 This point is developed further below. 
11 The last year for which comprehensive data are available. 
12 We believe it is preferable to push the analysis as far as each country’s data will allow, as opposed to 
limiting the Colombian analysis for the sake of symmetry. 
13 Thus α*m takes the value 0 for all municipalities and all years before 1994, and is identical to αm for all 
years from 1994 onwards. 
14 In any event, a lack of time-series data for Z and S would leave us no other choice even with a different 
methodology. 
15 There are, for example, 18 variables concerning the types of capacity-building programs that 
municipalities received after 1994, and 11 more on programs they may have requested. 
16 See for example Wolman in Bennet (1990). 
17 The proportion of the local population above a predetermined level of unsatisfied basic needs. 
18 Note that LHS data is not censored/truncated.  Observed “zeros” are real zeros, and not failures of 
measurement or excluded negative values.  Hence a 2SLS panel estimation is appropriate.  As a check, we 
also estimated the IV model with a Tobit first stage.  The findings did not change. 
19 The small number of municipalities with significant unspent sums implies that the money was spent 
elsewhere, not left in the bank. 
20 Our results for urban development – typically big, expensive construction projects – where private sector 
lobbying is strongly positive, support this interpretation. 
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